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ARGDMNNT 
1'UWl I 
UTAH'S INCLUSION OF BANK CHECKS LN THE SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY CLASSIFICATION DOES NOT ALTER THE 
CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF OTHER 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE. 
The State suggests that Ux. A /u d jlll. \ i| I, m lu<K s Unci spei ifu II.'HIN .ill 
nhrase "any other instrument or writing representing 
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an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise." 
The State argues: 
Subsection (3)(b) specifically enumerates 3 types of instruments: a check for 
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, and an issue of bonds. Defendant's 
argument ignores the significance of the legislature's intentional inclusion of 
a check and focuses only on the stocks and bonds language. 
Appellee's Brief at 8. 
In this argument, the State overlooks the fact that "any other instrument or 
writing" is part of a prepositional phrase which acts as an adjective modifying the noun, "an 
issue." It has no reference to "[a] check in the face amount of $100 or more."1 
As pointed out in Appellant's opening brief, U.C.A. 76-6-501(3) is comparable 
to the first sentence of Model Penal Code §224.1(2). Appellant's Brief at 9. If the Utah 
statute had not departed from the format of the Model Code by including a reference to "[a] 
check with a face amount of $100 or more," there would be little question that the holdings 
in People v. Korsen 117 Misc. 2d 875, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 380 (1983), and State v. Reed, 183 N.J. 
Super. 184, 443 A.2d 744 (1982), would resolve the issue here presented. 
In substance, the issue which the State raises is: What effect does the 
inclusion of bank checks have on the construction and interpretation of the language of 
xBy way of comparison, note the parallels existing between the language of subsection (3)(b) and the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code defining investment securities (i.e. stocks and bonds). 
U.C.A 76-6-501(3)(b): 
". . . any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise." 
U.C.A 70A-8-102(l): 
". . . a share, participation, or other interest in property of or an enterprise of the 
issuer, or an obligation of the issuer which is represented by an instrument. . .." 
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subsection (3)(b) as a whole? 
The State would have this Court believe that by including bank checks the 
Legislature intended to abandon any circumscription found in the Model Code's definition 
of second degree felony forgery. On the other hand, Defendant contends that the 
Legislature intended to include but one additional category of instruments in the second 
degree felony classification. 
The drafters of the Model Penal Code were careful to limit the second degree 
felony classification to the forgery of documents which would facilitate the perpetration of 
fraud on a large scale and the forgery of t!widely circulating instruments representing wealth." 
See Model Penal Code §224.1 comment 8. It seems highly unlikely that the Legislature 
intended to abandon that circumscription by the mere addition of bank checks to the second 
degree felony classification. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE SCOPE OF THE GENERAL TERM OF THE 
UTAH STATUTE HAS BEEN ALTERED, IT HAS NOT BEEN SO 
EXPANDED AS TO INCLUDE THE DOCUMENT HERE IN 
QUESTION. 
Defendant concedes that the New York and New Jersey statutes which are 
construed in Korsen and Reed do not include any reference to bank checks. In the event 
this Court concludes that the Utah Legislature intended the reference to bank checks to 
expand the scope of the general reference ("any other instrument or writing"), Korsen and 
Reed are arguably distinguishable. 
Like Utah, New Hampshire has included the forgery of bank checks, stock 
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certificates and bonds within the same grade of offense. Under Section 638:1, 111(b), 
Revised Statutes of New Hampshire, Annotated, 1955, forgery is a class B felony if the 
subject writing is or purports to be: f,a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest or 
claim against any person or enterprise." 
The State cites and relies on State v. Allegra, 129 N.H. 720, 533 A.2d 338 
(1987), contending that the case stands for the proposition that the general reference to "any 
other instrument11 in the New Hampshire statute takes color from the specific reference to 
bank checks as well as the reference to issues of stocks and bonds. Appellee's Brief at 8-9. 
In Allegra, the electric company advised the defendant by letter dated 
December 7, 1983, that the power service to an electrical sign at the defendant's place of 
business would be disconnected as the result of storm damage which the sign had sustained. 
On December 8, the defendant arranged insurance coverage for the sign under an existing 
policy. He did not disclose the fact that the sign had already been damaged. The following 
January he filed a claim under the insurance policy for the loss associated with the storm 
damage to the sign, supporting the claim with a copy of the December 7 letter from the 
electric company. The letter had been altered to indicate that it had been authored on 
December 19, 1983. 
In an opinion by Justice Souter, then of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, 
the unanimous court concluded: 
Before us, the defendant stands his ground in maintaining that the 
indictment charged only a misdemeanor, and the State has taken the 
position that it charged a felony. The defendant is correct. 
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The forgery indictment in this case charged that the defendant "did 
purposely alter the writing of the Public Service Company , , by 
changing the date on a disconnect notice [i.e., letter] sent to Joseph 
Allegra . , . . " The indictment included the notation, "Class B Felony," 
The notation was clearly wrong. * Ilie letter or "disconnect notice" is 
not one of the documents specifically listed in RSA 638:1, 111(a) and 
(b). Nor does it fall within the latter subparagraph's general category 
of "any other instrument representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest or claim against any person or 
enterprise." RSA 638:1, 111(b). The document was a letter informing 
the defendant that the company had turned off the power to an 
advertising sign damaged by wind. It created no property interest and 
independently predicated no claim of title or entitlement in the manner 
of a check, a stock certificate or a bond. While the State points out 
that the defendant employed the letter to support his claim for 
insurance reimbursement, this position fails to recognize the distinction 
between the nature of the document and the nature of the defendant's 
independent use of that document. [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 341 -342 
Note that in determining the scope of instruments falling within ihr IHnny 
classification, the New Hamml-r-. .. of instruments which create or 
pmpmi in nv.nlr property interests «M H\VU\ win* h a . iaim of title or entitlement can be 
"independently predicated." la. ai ^ suggests that the B 
It' It my loigerv * lassif icniion is applied only to those documents which appear to have intrinsic 
value such as bank checks, stock certificates and bond?,, i lit1 "otii i was UIIWIIIMIU in rlassitv 
the forgerv P % . . * - ,, value as a felony regardless of the fact that the 
document had been used in furthering a fraudulent scheme. 
Even il tlust ouii • HIHIIHII • i|<ai iln .m ii is ion of any bank check in the second 
-ri!i«v felom classification should be construed to expand the general reference to other 
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instruments and writings, it does not follow that the instrument here in questioa falls within 
the second degree felony classification. All of the specific references in Subsection (3)(b) 
still relate to instruments which by their very nature purportedly possess intrinsic value. 
In the instant case, the State attempts to devise a scenario under which the 
Radio Shack receipt would have possessed some intrinsic value. In so doing, the State 
alleges: 
In the normal course of business., a customer's signature on a properly 
drafted invoice for returned merchandise represents a claim against 
Radio Shack for the purchase price of the merchandise which has been 
returned. When the signed invoice is returned to the store employee, 
the purchase price is given to the customer in satisfaction of the claim 
or, if store funds are insufficient, the customer is sent to another 
location where, upon presentation, the invoice is paid (Prelim, at 6, 22-
23). Consequently, an invoice for the return of merchandise 
represents, however briefly, a customer's pecuniary claim against the 
business.[2] 
Appellee's Brief at 9. 
The State's argument cleverly suggests that the receipt represents the 
embodiment of an obligation which must be paid upon presentment of the document and 
that the document therefore has intrinsic value. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "receipt" as follows: 
Written acknowledgment of the receipt of money, or a thing of value, 
without containing any affirmative obligation upon either party to it; a 
mere admission of a fact, in writing. And, being a mere 
acknowledgment of payment, is subject to parole explanation or 
contradiction. 
A receipt is never the embodiment of an outstanding claim, it is evidence that 
2Note that there is nothing in the record which indicates that Radio Shack customers were required 
to sign any invoice acknowledging receipt of funds prior to actually receiving the cash refund. 
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a claim has been extinguished. A receipt cannot be presented by way of demand. While 
a fictitious receipt may be used in connection with the orchestration of a fraud, a property 
interest is not evidenced thereby nor can a claim of title or entitlement be "independently 
predicated" thereon. 
By contrast, a person who acquires a bank check, a stock certificate or a bond 
acquires an instrument which embodies a claim or entitlement that can be asserted against 
another, whether it be the bank upon which the check is drawn, the corporation which issued 
the stock certificate, or the person or entity which executed the bond. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the receipt in question does not fall within the 
second degree felony classification and, therefore, the judgment of conviction should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the district court with instruments to reduce Defendant's 
conviction from a second degree felony to the class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this %\t day of October, 1992. 
J£l 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Assistant Attorney General, Kris Leonard, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
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Gary W. Pendleton 
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